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ABSTRACT
The Islamic finance industry should refrain from replicating conventional 
tools by complicated scams which hold Arabic names. There is enough room 
for product development within the sphere of Islamic Shari’ah. Today, the 
Islamic finance industry is still heavily recourse to commodity Murabaha 
for liquidity management regardless of prohibition of the practice by Islamic 
Fiqh Academia. This mainly results from the lack of a proper liquidity 
management alternative for Islamic banks. Although Sukuk can serve the 
purpose to some extent, not only commodity Murabaha but also Sukuk is 
not expected to underpin the Islamic finance industry for the future. In this 
paper, 2-Step Murabaha is proposed as a strong alternative to the popular 
but questionable Islamic resource mobilization/liquidity management 
tools. It is suggested that the Islamic finance industry healthily rise on 
2-Step Murabaha. The literature review part of the paper dwells on Islamic 
finance in the context of resource mobilization/liquidity management. The 
disbursement procedures in full detail are explained for the 2-Step Murabaha 
transaction in a case of a Gambian importer and an Egyptian exporter of 
yarn. Then, the structure is evaluated to suggest the 2-Step Murabaha to be 
embedded in stock exchanges in order to facilitate international trade while 
serving the Islamic finance industry for liquidity management.
Keywords: 2-Step Murabaha, commodity Murabaha, Sukuk, resource 
mobilization, liquidity management, Tawarruq
THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FINANCE: 
2-STEP MURABAHA
Ahmet Suayb Gundogdu
Islamic Development Bank, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
E-mail: ahmetsuayb@hotmail.com 
ARTICLE InFO
Article History: 
Received: 3 January 2018
Accepted: 21 February 2018
Published: 30 April 2018
108
Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal, Volume 13 Issue 1
INTRODUCTION
A detrimental question for the Islamic finance industry, today, is whether to 
replicate the entire conventional system by creating instruments identical 
in substance through “combining a redundant succession of trade and 
label with Arabic name” (Moddy’s, 2008) or innovate and streamline new 
products compliant to Islamic Shari’ah. As evidenced from the literature, the 
Islamic finance industry today tends to replicate conventional instruments 
by making it more complicated while stand vulnerable to the flaws of 
the conventional system. After the 2008 financial crisis triggered by the 
conventional financial system, Islamic finance with its focus on tangible 
assets and Shari’ah principles was perceived to have the potential to prevent 
sufferings of the conventional system. However, this perception that Islamic 
finance is “immune to the excesses of the financial crisis” is challenged by 
recent defaults of the Sukuk and gives rise to loss of confidence by investors. 
In a nutshell, Islamic principles cannot buffer bad investment decisions but 
Shari’ah compliance problems with existing Sukuk leads to bad credit risks 
for Sukuk issuances as well. For example, Dana Gas Mudaraba Sukuk is 
and iconic case showing dichotomy of Sukuk. In 2017, the Sukuk issuer 
claimed that the Mudaraba Sukuk structure in which the Dana Gas Sukuk 
was issued is not Shari’ah compliant so as to avoid their obligations. 
nevertheless, the Sukuk structure, prior to issuance, was approved by the 
Shari’ah advisers paid by Dana Gas.1 In an ideal world, financial resources 
should be directed to support sustainable economic development to create 
more wealth for economically empowering people; which is not the case 
with the present Islamic finance practices and Sukuk. The pitfalls of Sukuk 
urge for alternative resource mobilization and liquidity management tools 
to be harnessed for economic growth while serving the needs of Islamic 
financial institutions.   
Islamic financial institutions very often avoid borrowing from other 
banks in order to avoid Riba which is prohibited in Islam. As it is obvious 
from its basic principles, Islamic law introduces many restrictions on 
commercial contracts in order to ensure justice in the transaction, avoid 
possible prospective legal disputes, and ultimately give rise to a stable 
economic and financial system for the society. Traditionally, Islamic 
Banks recourse to Sukuk and Commodity Murabaha instruments to 
1 https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1057/jbr.2014.3 last accessed on 29th of September 2017.
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mobilize resources and manage their liquidity. However, recent failures 
in the Sukuk market and common dissatisfaction with the Tawarruq based 
Commodity Murabaha urge for development of alternative Islamic resource 
mobilization/liquidity management tools. Basically, financial resources are 
needed for project finance and trade finance. Project Investment Sukuk can 
address the resource mobilization problem for project finance. However, 
the real resource mobilization need comes from huge amounts needed for 
international and local trade finance. Gundogdu (2016) highlighted that 
“given that the nature of Islamic finance is about facilitating bono-fide 
transactions, the trade aspect of the Islamic finance industry should react to 
develop Shari’ah-compliant products to support the increased international 
trade of the OIC countries, which hit a value of US$4.12 trillion in 2012.2 
If Islamic finance cannot develop products which directly link trade and 
financial resources, pseudo Sukuk and commodity Murabaha would fill the 
gap, and, that is what happened. 
In this regard, Gundogdu (2009) introduced the 2-Step Murabaha 
concept for resource mobilization in the context of international trade as 
an alternative to Mudaraba and Sukuk, which are not Shari’ah compliant, 
as well as commodity Murabaha. As explained by Gundogdu (2009), one 
of the most widely used contract in Islamic finance is Murabaha. This 
paper proposes the introduction of the 2-Step Murabaha to replace the 
commodity Murabaha for good and be a good alternative to Sukuk. Islamic 
banks can place their excess funds to refinance the letter of credit under 
the Murabaha agreement between a bank and an importer. Assuming an 
importer is in Gambia, which needs to import yarn from Egypt by opening a 
letter of credit through its local bank as requested by the Egyptian exporter, 
after receiving the financing request from the importer, the local Gambian 
bank can mobilize resources through an international Islamic bank. The 
international Islamic bank would buy yarn and sell it to the local Gambian 
bank with a mark-up in differed payment and the Gambian bank would sell 
it to the importer. As opposed to the commodity Murabaha, in this scheme 
the Islamic bank manages its liquidity by supporting trade and, hence, 
contributing to the economic development of a least developed country. As 
stated above, the objective of this paper is to show how to mobilize resources 
to be availed for SMEs, particularly in least developed countries, under 
2 This was a substantial increase (of around threefold) compared to the 2004 level of US$1.43 trillion. 
During the same period, world trade only increased by around twofold”.  
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the direct Murabaha Sale transformed into a 2-Step Murabaha scheme. 
The structure of the 2-Step Murabaha has already explained by Gundogdu 
(2009). Practical details are explained in this paper. 
In the next section, a literature review on Islamic finance in the context 
of resource mobilization and liquidity management vis-à-vis Sukuk and 
commodity Murabaha is provided. The third section explains the details 
of the disbursement mechanism for the 2-Step Murabaha line provided to 
local bank in Gambia (Bank-C) from an international Islamic bank (Bank-B) 
through the 2-Step Murabaha Financing. The final section highlights the 
proposed structure by Gundogdu (2014) and Gundogdu (2016) for liquidity 
management within an efficient stock exchange and concludes.  
LITERATURE REVIEW ON ISLAMIC RESOURCE 
MOBILIZATION AND LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
Gundogdu (2016) unveils the dilemma concerning products developed in 
the Islamic finance industry concerning liquidity management. He argues 
that before looking into details, the evaluation should start by checking for 
compliance with the Maqasid Al-Shari’ah and contribution to real economic 
activities. Specific to liquidity management, he lists Bai Al-Inah, Bai Al-
Dayn, and organized Tawarruq as types of contacts used for non-Shari’ah 
compliant products. 
However, closing the chapter by merely saying “forbidden” or 
notorious Arabic equivalent word “Memnu” may not be that easy due to 
liquidity risks. As Waemustafa and Sukri (2016) highlight, Islamic banks 
maintain higher liquidity than conventional banks against liquidity risks. 
Dusiki (2007) states: “Liquidity is an important characteristic of banks. 
By their very nature, banks transform the term of their liabilities to have 
different maturities on the asset side of the balance sheet. At the same 
time, banks must be able to meet their commitments such as deposits at 
the point at which they become due. Thus, liquidity management lies at the 
heart of confidence in the banking operation”. He counts liquidity risks as 
a significant one for Islamic banks due to limited availability of Shari’ah 
compatible money market tools. Accordingly, he counts introduction of the 
commodity Murabaha based on the Tawarruq as an innovative liquidity 
management tool.   
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Umer Chapra and Habib Ahmad (2002) addressed the liquidity 
management difficulties with Islamic Banks in their work of “Corporate 
Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions”. As they state “two of the 
primary reasons for this are: the non-availability of adequate Shari’ah 
compatible investment opportunities and the difficulty of raising liquidity 
in a Shari’ah compatible manner”.
As indicated by Loqman (1999) the Islamic finance system is 
characterized by the absence of interest based transactions, short-selling, 
manipulation, doubtful transactions which may include unlawful activities 
within the Islamic Jurisprudence.  As he defines, the objective of the Islamic 
financial system, based on the Islamic Shari’ah, is to transfer funds from 
the surplus to the deficit units. In this regard, Islamic finance as viewed by 
Muslims is an alternative health system to an interest based financial system 
(Khan, 1992). Siddiqi (2008) highlighted various Islamic finance contracts 
which exclude interest (Riba), avoid major uncertainty (Gharar) and does 
not include gambling features (Maysir).
Based on these contracts, although questionable from the Shari’ah 
compliance point of view, Islamic banks have developed products for 
resource mobilization and liquidity management. Controversial Islamic 
finance resource mobilization and liquidity management tools have been 
the Sukuk and the Tawarruq based commodity Murabaha. Both instruments 
give rise to serious debates on their economic impact and suitability to 
Islamic principles. A commodity Murabaha transaction involves buying 
and selling of metal commodities to provide conformity with the Islamic 
Shariah. The banks would mobilize resources from Islamic banks through 
the Tawarruq. In real life, an Islamic bank, a conventional bank as an 
agent, and two separate brokers to effect sales of metal commodities would 
be the parties in a commodity Murabaha transaction. The Islamic bank 
buys commodity from the first broker, through the agency of commercial 
bank, and sells it to the second broker with a mark-up in differed payment. 
This transaction has no purpose more than resource mobilization for the 
conventional bank and liquidity management for the Islamic Bank. That is, 
its economic benefit to society is quite questionable as its connection with 
trade and industry is missed. 
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The organized Tawarruq based commodity Murabaha, which unlike 
the name reveals it as not a real Murabaha, was initially used in inter-
bank lending. In due course the scope was extended to consumer loans 
as well as so-called Islamic derivatives.3 To avoid criticism Islamic banks 
developed the Tawarruq based on so called trading of stocks or physical 
commodities in warehouses. In either of them the result is the same. There is 
no real economic activity even if these non-moving assets are being traded. 
Alzaidi and Kazakov (2017) introduced a trading platform to facilitate such 
practices. However, any platform should better be designed to facilitate 
economic activity rather than be a lending activity.  
Siddiqi (2007) in his position paper presented at the workshop on 
Tawarruq: A Methodological Issue in Shariah compliant Finance” examined 
the impact of the Tawarruq on the economy. As he mentions, every Tawarruq 
based transaction for resource mobilizing party (Mutawarriq) would create 
debts which is larger than the cash transferred to the liquidity managing party 
(which Islamic banks in present practice). In both the Islamic Tawarruq and 
conventional forms, debt paper resulted to repeated financial speculative 
transactions. Though the Tawarruq transactions are supposed to be based 
on real assets at the start, the link with real assets would be severed without 
creating any wealth but debt. This process, gives rise to an inverted pyramid 
of financial instrument underpinned by a small asset base. The Tawarruq 
moves a transaction from real economy to a money (debt) market where the 
equilibrating mechanism is no longer linked to the real economy. Then, he 
scrutinized the consequences of this very creation of debt which is larger than 
the cash generated and counts the harms and benefits of the Tawarruq as: 
1. It gives rise to creation of debt which tends to accelerate;
2. It emerges as exchange of money with money which is deemed to be 
unfair in the context of risk and uncertainty involved;  
3. It leads to speculation from gambling through debt proliferation; 
4. As it is debt financing, the practice seeds instability in an economy. 
In a debt-based economy money supply is linked to debt which gives 
rise to inflationary expansion;
5. This practice is likely to deteriorate income distribution and 
inefficiently allocate resources; 
3 Thomson Reuters Report: “Liquidity Management Through Sukuk; Innovative Solutions”. (2017)
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6. As debt financing, this practice contributes to anxiety in society and 
destruction of the environment. 
As he suggests, the harmful consequences of the Tawarruq are much 
greater than the benefits. He concludes that financial tools whose harm is 
greater than the benefits shall not be deemed as Shari’ah compliant. 
Similarly, Shalhoob (2010), studied organized the Tawarruq in Islamic 
Law and suggested that an organized Tawarruq as it is the case with the 
commodity Murabaha does not seem to be acceptable in Islamic Law.  On 
the other hand, he counts the organized Tawarruq as less unacceptable than 
usury which is obviously prohibited in Islamic Law. He further states that 
in case the money needed for an unimportant need, Islamic jurisprudence 
does not recommend involvement in organized Tawarruq.   
Iqbal and Molyneux (2005), with reference to the Islamic doctrine 
of universal permissibility in business practices which revolve around: 
“everything is permissible unless it is clearly prohibited”, explains the causes 
for rejection of conventional banking in Islamic Law and theestablishment 
of Islamic Banks operating under the profit and loss sharing principle. They 
introduced the principles and theoretical underpinning for Islamic Banking 
and its instruments as the Musharakah, Mudarabah, Murabaha, Ijarah, 
Salam and Istisna. On the other hand, they did not mention the Tawarruq, 
one of the most controversial instrument which has been practiced by Islamic 
banks regardless of declaration of the Islamic Fiqh Academy (Majma’ al 
Fiqh al-Islami)’s proceedings which counts the Tawarruq as non-compatible 
with Islamic Law.     
Dusiki (2007) highlights the importance of liquidity management 
for banks and provided some insights of the commodity Murabaha as 
a liquidity management tool for Islamic financial institutions. He also 
reviewed the Shari’ah issues related to the underlying contract of the 
commodity Murabaha namely, the Tawarruq. He identified the Tawarruq 
based commodity Murabaha as a value added product which can meet 
investment interests of Islamic financial institutions that are uncomfortable 
with the Inah based instruments. As Al-Zuhayli (1989) explained the Bay 
Al-Inah is an arrangement in which one party sells an asset to another party 
with deferred payment. Unlike the Murabaha, there is no third party and the 
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selling party buys back the asset from the buying party before the payment 
of deferred price and for cash of a lesser amount than the deferred price. As 
Ali (2007) states, the majority of Muslim jurists nullified the Bay Al-Inah 
as it is a red herring to circumvent the Riba transaction. Ahmad (2007) 
highlighted the purpose with the Tawarruq based commodity Murabaha 
as attaining liquidity for the buyer and resource mobilization for the other 
party in the transaction in which the buyer purchases an asset from the other 
party with a differed payment and subsequently sells the asset to a third 
party on cash of a lesser amount than purchase price.     
Although the form of the Bay Al-Inah and alternative the Tawarruq 
based commodity Murabaha have different forms, both instruments serve 
the same economic substance. In both cases, the transaction is liquidity 
management for one party and resource mobilization for the other. There 
is no touch to the economy in the form of trade finance, infrastructure 
development or industrial financing. In this form, both instruments are 
akin to disguised loans in conventional financing. Accordingly, as it once 
happened to the Bay Al-Inah, the underlying contract for the commodity 
Murabaha, Tawarruq, was tackled by Islamic jurists. Two rulings were 
issued by the Islamic Fiqh Academy. In its 15th session, in September 1998, 
the academy permitted the Tawarruq given that the buyer of the asset, the 
customer of Islamic banks, does not sell the asset to its original seller in 
order to eschew the Inah which has been disallowed as it is perceived to 
be legal trick for circumventing prohibition of the Riba. nevertheless, the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy in its 17th session, held in December 2003, classified 
the Tawarruq as real Tawarruq (Tawarruq Haqiqi) and organized the 
Tawarruq (Tawarruq Munazzam). The real Tawarruq has been allowed 
but the organized Tawarruq, practiced by Islamic financial institutions, 
disallowed as it is perceived to be synthetic and fictitious like the Bay Al-
Inah. Mohamad and Rahman (2014) finds that “the analysis demonstrates 
that most of the studies on Tawarruq discussed the fundamental theories 
which concerning the area of jurisprudence, while a few of them did discuss 
the application aspect in the banking environment. However, none of the 
operational process is discussed in-depth, whereas the risk of Shari’ah 
non-compliance might arise in the detail transaction.” Gundogdu (2014) 
provided details of the commodity Murabaha transactions. It is intended 
herewith to define a detailed transaction for a product proposed, the 2-Step 
Murabaha, as an alternative to the Tawarruq based commodity Murabaha.
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Another major instrument of Islamic financial institutions for resource 
mobilization and liquidity management is the Sukuk that is the plural of 
the word sakk. In Arabic it means “legal instrument, deed, check” for “any 
document representing a contract or conveyance of rights, obligations or 
monies done in conformity with the Shari’ah” (Sukuk.me, 2010a). It is also 
known as an Islamic equivalent of a bond. As a fixed income or interest 
(Riba) bearing bonds are not permissible in Islam, the Sukuk are securities 
to comply with Islamic Law. Although the Sukuk were extensively used in 
medieval Islam for transferring obligations originating from commercial 
activities including trade, in modern times the Sukuk relates to asset 
securitization. In its simplest form, the Sukuk transforms future cash flow 
of an asset, existing or to be available in the future, to present cash flow. It 
is a certificate of usufruct or ownership of an asset which entitles the owner 
to get a return generated from the asset, at least in theory. This certificate 
is issued through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which acquires the asset 
and declares a trust in favour of the holder of the certificate. The certificate 
might present ownership of the asset or entitlement of rental income (Sukuk.
me, 2010b). Therefore, this certificate provides returns to a holder from 
either profits from rental, profit of sales or combination of both. In return 
the certificate owner takes the credit risk of the underlying asset, again at 
least in the theory of it (Sukuk.me, 2010c). 
In theory, the Sukuk should be based on mainstream Islamic contracts 
as the Musharaka, Mudaraba, Salam, Murabaha, Ijara, Istisna. However, 
today a chunk of the Sukuk is based on the unacceptable Bai Al-Inah, Bai 
Al-Dayn and the commodity Murabaha or a hybrid of these contracts with 
permissible ones. As Valente (2009) states, the Islamic finance industry is 
dominated by the Sukuk and at least much of academic literature revolves 
around the Sukuk, Shari’ah compatibility of most of which is questionable, 
as opposed to the possible permissible products. 
Since the first issuance in late 1996, there have been several Sukuk 
failures of defaults, though there is no clear definition of the Sukuk default 
in Shari’ah. However, from a technical perspective it is basically the 
inability of the obligor with the Sukuk to make payments on the due date. 
The Sukuk itself implies the presence of an underlying asset owned by the 
certificate owner so an entire failure is not perceived to be possible. In case 
of Sukuk default, the obligor seeks a rollover on payments or restructuring, 
or otherwise embark on a litigation process. However, defaults of real-estate 
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development the Sukuk post-2008 and the 2017 Dana Gas Mudaraba Sukuk 
unveil the problems with the modern Sukuk issuance. In case of the Dana Gas, 
the issuer itself declares that the Sukuk structure is not Shari’ah compliant in 
order to avoid its obligation towards Sukuk holders.4 The Sukuk, in theory, 
is intended as an  investment tool for long-term project finance, hence, it is 
not much extendable to fulfill the liquidity management need of the Islamic 
finance industry. Then whyis the so called Sukuk, unrelated to real economic 
investment, used in liquidity management and resource mobilization? Haque 
et al. (2017) with an empirical study present that the Sukuk issuances are not 
perceived to be different than conventional securitized bonds in the market 
and most of them may not be deemed Shari’ah compliant. The Sukuk can 
be categorized as Asset-Backed and Asset-Based. In case of the asset-based 
Sukuk there is no access to the underlying assets in case of default but future 
cash flow. That is how Sukuk defaults happens. Even in case of the asset-
backed Sukuk, access to underlying assets by Sukuk holders might not be 
straight forward (Salah, 2010).  
DISBURSEMENT PROCEDURE FOR THE 2-STEP 
MURABAHA 
In international trade, very often exporters would ask for Letter of Credit as 
a condition precedent to the shipment. A standard Letter of Credit transaction 
flow would be: 
1. An export contract would be signed between the importer and the 
exporter. 
2. The importer fills a standard application form requesting his bank 
(Bank-C in this particular case) to issue an irrevocable Letter of Credit 
in favor of the exporter overseas. 
3. The importer’s bank (Bank-C) issues its irrevocable L/C in accordance 
with the importer’s instructions and sends to the advising bank (usually 
the exporter’s bank)
4. The advising bank notifies the credit to the exporter. 
5. Upon notification, the exporter ships the goods based on the L/C terms 
and conditions and presents the shipping documents, including Bill 
of Lading, to the negotiating bank.
4 https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1057/jbr.2014.3 last accessed on 29th of September 2017.
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6. The negotiating bank checks the documents and if everything is 
in order, pays the exporter. Then, it refers to the issuing bank for 
reimbursement. The issuing bank would reimburse to the negotiating 
bank given the documents are in compliance with the L/C terms.
7. The importer collects the document from the issuing bank (Bank-C 
in this particular case) and takes possession of the goods for custom 
clearance.
Under the 2-Step Murabaha financing, the importer can open an L/C 
in the Bank-C and Bank-C transmits a copy to an international Bank-B.5 
Excerpt of the content of L/C in disbursement under 2-step Murabaha is 
shown in Table 1 below. The main body of such an L/C would be indicated 
in Appendix A. For the purpose of demonstration, the importer from Gambia 
applies to Bank-C for opening of L/C in favour of the exporter in Egypt to 
import wool and polyester yarn under the Two-Step Murabaha Financing 
provided by international Bank-B.
 
Table 1: Content of L/C in Disbursement under 2-Step Murabaha
40A: Form of Documentary Credit
IRREVOABLE
20: Documentary Credit Number
CEN/92040198 
31C: Date of Issue
Date: 100330
40E: Applicable Rules
UCPURR LATEST VERSION
31D: Date and Place of Expiry
Date: 100630
Place: IN EGYPT
50: Applicant
THE IMPORTER,
ADDRESS OF THE IMPORTER,
ACCOUNT NUMBER OF IMPORTER WITH BANK-C
59: Beneficiary
Name &Addresss: THE EXPORTER
ADDRESS OF THE EXPORTER
TEL:XXXXX
32B: Currency Code, Amount
Currency Code: US Dollar
Amount: US$ 312,750.00
Source: Specimen prepared by the author based on draft provided by IDB Group
5 Unlike Direct Murabaha Sale, not the importer but Bank-C makes the disbursement request through 
a standard “Form of Offer” which indicates the first “Sale Price”. Upon the receipt of this form, 
Bank-B responds to Bank-C with a standard “Form of Acceptance” indicating the “Purchase 
Price”. 
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After receiving the above copy of the L/C, Bank-B issues an ICR 
(Irrevocable Commitment for Reimbursement) and sends the ICR to:
A. The negotiating bank
B. The issuing bank (Bank-C)
C. Its Paying Agent Bank
by which Bank-B agrees to reimburse the negotiating bank the amount 
under the L/C opened by the importer from Bank-C. After the shipment by 
the exporter, Bank-B’s paying agent honours the claim from the negotiating 
bank based on the satisfactory shipment documentation, such as Bill of 
Lading, invoice, etc., identified in the L/C. Details of the transaction can 
be found in the Figure 1.6 Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal, Volume 13 Issue 1 
Figure 1: Disbursement Procedure under L/C 
(Source: As Cited from Gundogdu, 2009) 
 
In many cases, the L/C issued by a bank in Least Developed Countries is not perceived to 
be solid by exporters in other countries as these exporters are not convinced about the capacity of 
banks in these countries to honour their obligations tied to the L/C issued. Very often, exporters 
ask the L/C confirmation from another bank outside the country which generates an additional 
L/C confirmation cost for importers in Least Developed Countries. Hence, there is a potential for 
trade facilitation opportunities in this areas by reducing additional confirmation cost. For 
example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development with its Regional Trade 
Facilitation Programme, which is network of banks enjoying EBRD’s guarantee, have addressed 
this issue since 1998. The EBRD provides guarantee to confirming banks and undertakes the 
political and commercial payment risk of issuing banks in developing countries.7     
 
As the content of the ICR indicates in Table 2, it acts as a replacement to the L/C 
confirmation. Table 2 shows the SWIFT message sent from Bank-B to its paying agent to inform 
and instruct an upcoming payment claim. Bank-B sends a message to her paying agent bank with 
the copy of its commitment (ICR) sent to the exporter’s bank assuring the payment, upon 
successful negotiation of the shipping documents by the exporter, to be done through the paying 
agent. With the issuance of the ICR by Bank-B, the Gambian Bank-C does not need to seek 
confirmation to its L/C from international banks: the exporter’s bank would not ask for the L/C 
to be confirmed. Hence, this 2-Step Muarabaha structure, in addition to availing trade finance, 
can be a remedy for difficulties associated with the L/C confirmation for many Least Developed 
Countries. 
                                                            
7 Available at: http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/trade-facilitation-programme.html accessed on 30 September 2017. 
Figure 1: Disbursement Procedure under L/C
(Source: As Cited from Gundogdu, 2009)
In many cases, the L/C issued by a bank in Least Developed Countries 
is not perceived to be solid by exporters in other countries as these exporters 
re no  convinced about the capacity f banks in these countries o hon ur 
their obligations tied to the L/C issued. Very often, exporters ask the L/C 
confirmation from another bank outside the country which generates an 
additional L/C co firmati n cost fo  importers in Least Developed Countries. 
Hence, there is a potential for trade facilitation opportunities in this areas 
by reducing additional confirmation cost. For example, the European Bank 
6 In (8.A), Paying Agent would reimburse at the date of maturity (i.e. 90 days from the date of Bill 
of Lading) if the L/C is not at Sight.
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for Reconstruction and Development with its Regional Trade Facilitation 
Programme, which is network of banks enjoying EBRD’s guarantee, have 
addressed this issue since 1998. The EBRD provides guarantee to confirming 
banks and undertakes the political and commercial payment risk of issuing 
banks in developing countries.7    
As the content of the ICR indicates in Table 2, it acts as a replacement 
to the L/C confirmation. Table 2 shows the SWIFT message sent from 
Bank-B to its paying agent to inform and instruct an upcoming payment 
claim. Bank-B sends a message to her paying agent bank with the copy of 
its commitment (ICR) sent to the exporter’s bank assuring the payment, 
upon successful negotiation of the shipping documents by the exporter, to 
be done through the paying agent. With the issuance of the ICR by Bank-B, 
the Gambian Bank-C does not need to seek confirmation to its L/C from 
international banks: the exporter’s bank would not ask for the L/C to be 
confirmed. Hence, this 2-Step Muarabaha structure, in addition to availing 
trade finance, can be a remedy for difficulties associated with the L/C 
confirmation for many Least Developed Countries.
7 Available at: http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/trade-facilitation-programme.html accessed on 
30 September 2017.
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Table 2: Content of ICR in Disbursement under 2-Step Murabaha
ATTN: TRADE FINANCE SERVICES
WE HAVE ADVISED ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK, ADDRESS OF ADVISING/
EXPORTER’S BANK, SWIFT CODE, AS FOLLOWS: -
QUOTE
ATTN: DOCUMENTARY CREDITS DEPT.
OUR REF: DS/BANK-B/GAM 0001 (PLS QUOTE IN ALL
CORRESP.) WE HEREBY ISSUE OUR IRREVOCABLE
COMMITMENT FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF CLAIMS UNDER
FOLLOWING L/C PRESENTED TO OUR PAYING AGENT BANK, UPTO A MAXIMUM OF 
US$ 312,750 (UNITED STATES DOLLAR THREE HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN 
HUNDRED FIFTY ONLY)
PROVIDED THE NEGOTIATING BANK CERTIFIES TO THEM BY AUTHENTICATED 
MESSAGE THAT ALL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF L/C HAVE BEEN COMPLIED 
WITH. WE HAVE SENT A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE TO OUR PAYING AGENT BANK 
AUTHORIZING THEM TO HONOUR CLAIMS FROM THE NEGOTIATING BANK AFTER 
3 (THREE) WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT BY THEM OF THE NEGOTIATING BANK’S 
CERTIFICATE AS NOTED ABOVE.
L/C DETAILS: 
1. L/C NO.: CEN/92040198 
2. ISSUED BY: BANK-C
             (CENTRAL BRANCH)
             BANJUL, THE GAMBIA (SWIFT CODE OF BANK-C)
3. BY ORDER OF: THE NAME OF THE IMPORTER, ADDRESS OF THE IMPORTER, TEL: 
XXXXX
4. FAVOUR: THE NAME OF THE EXPORTER, ADDRESS OF THE EXPORTER, TEL: 
XXXXX 
5. AMOUNT: US$ 312,750
6. EXPIRY: 30.06.2010
7. LATEST SHIPMENT: 09.06.2010
8. ADVISING BANK: SWIFT CODE OF ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK, ADDRESS OF 
ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK
9. PAYMENT: AT SIGHT
10. BANKING CHARGES: ALL BANKING CHARGES OUTSIDE THE GAMBIA ARE FOR 
ACCOUNT OF THE BENEFICIARY.
IN THE EVENT THERE ARE ANY DISCREPANCIES IN OR AMENDMENTS TO THE ABOVE 
MENTIONED L/C DETAILS OR TO (I) THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, (II) THE
DESCRIPTION OF GOODS, (III) THE QUANTITY OF GOODS AND (IV)THE INSURANCE 
CLAUSE, THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE BANK-B MUST BE OBTAINED IN ORDER THAT 
THIS COMMITMENT REMAINS OPERATIVE. ANY OTHER AMENDMENTS ISSUED BY 
THE L/C. ISSUING BANK DO NOT REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OF THE BANK-B. 
UNQUOTE.
KINDLY HONOUR TO THE DEBIT OF BANK-B US DOLLAR CALL ACCOUNT 
NO.3400000002 CLAIMS FROM THE NEGOTIATING BANK AGAINST THEIR TESTED 
MSG CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AS ABOVE. YOUR AUTHORITY TO PAY UNDER 
THIS COMMITMENT IS VALID FOR ONE MONTH AFTER THE EXPIRY DATE OF THE L/C.
Source: Specimen prepared by the author based on draft provided by IDB Group
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The 2-Step Murabaha trade financing through the ICR can not only 
be an effective tool to avail more financing in Least Developed Countries 
but also play a trade facilitation role by eliminating the need for additional 
L/C confirmation outside the country. Diffusion of the 2-Step Murabaha 
would create substantial means for Least Developed Countries to promote 
their trade. 
CONCLUSION 
It should not be surprising to know the unwillingness of international 
banks in taking the risk of importers in an unknown market to them. They 
are more comfortable to assume the risk of another financial institution 
in another country rather than small companies (Gundogdu 2009). The 
2-Step Murabaha Financing Mechanism can be used to mobilize resources 
from financial institutions to serve least developed countries. Under this 
mechanism, international banks avail funds to the banks of least developed 
countries, which then provides it to SMEs. In this scheme, international 
banks would take the risk of a local bank in need of necessary foreign 
exchange funds to support local SMEs. As we call the international bank 
as Bank-B and the local bank as Bank-C, the system works in such a way 
that Bank-B purchases the goods and sells it to Bank-C for a mark-up on a 
predetermined maturity date. Then, Bank-C sells the goods to the importer/
SME as per another Murabaha agreement between them. 
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The existence of two separate Murabaha sales increases the merit of 
the structure. Bank-C can buy goods on a 12-month tenor with a four (4) 
per cent mark-up from Bank-B and can sell the goods at a three (3) month 
tenor with a five (5) percent mark-up to the importer. Upon the receipt of 
the sale price from the importer, Bank-C can use the money for 9 months 
at its disposal for other transactions up until paying back Bank-B. With 
such a mechanism, banks would fulfill their mandate of collecting excess 
funds from those have and placing them in areas where funds are needed 
to support bono-fide economic activities.   
The 2-Step Murabaha transfers the direct credit risk of the importer 
SME to a local bank which would be considered for exposure by international 
banks. It can be discerned that this mechanism can be used to boost Small 
and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) in least developed countries to turn 
on the engine of growth. As presented by Gundogdu (2016), the 2-Step 
Murabaha scheme can further be embedded into stock exchanges as an 
alternative to the Sukuk, and the commodity Murabaha so as to support real 
economic transactions. Migrating the scheme to an electronic platform can 
decrease the cost of trade finance for least developed countries by creating 
a competitive 2-Step Murabaha market under stock exchanges by which 
Bank-C can mobilize resources, based on pre-specified stock exchange 
terms and conditions, from competing banks which pursue liquidity 
management. Given the trillion-dollar magnitude of trade finance, there is 
a huge potential for a streamlined 2-Step Murabaha in stock exchanges in 
pursuit of availing resources of Islamic finance for economic development 
as opposed to the speculative commodity Murabaha and Sukuk. As the 
literature review reveals both the commodity Murabaha and Sukuk give rise 
to serious concerns as being instruments for embedding Islamic finance to 
the conventional financial system. In order to keep Islamic finance aligned 
with the real economy and divert more funds from speculative financial 
instruments to bono-fide transactions, cooperation among Stock Exchanges 
of OIC counties is essential after streamlining the 2-Step Murabaha on an 
electronic trading platform. In this way, Islamic finance can rise in a real 
Islamic way. 
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APPENDIX A: 
Content of L/C in Disbursement under 2-Step Murabaha
40A: Form of Documentary Credit
IRREVOABLE
20: Documentary Credit Number
CEN/92040198 
31C: Date of Issue
Date: 100330
40E: Applicable Rules
UCPURR LATEST VERSION
31D: Date and Place of Expiry
Date: 100630
Place: IN EGYPT
50: Applicant
THE IMPORTER,
ADDRESS OF THE IMPORTER,
ACCOUNT NUMBER OF IMPORTER WITH BANK-C
59: Beneficiary
Name &Addresss: THE EXPORTER
ADDRESS OF THE EXPORTER
TEL:XXXXX
32B: Currency Code, Amount
Currency Code: US Dollar
Amount: US$ 312,750.00
41A: Available With … By …
Identifier Code: SWIFT CODE OF ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK ADDRESS OF ADVISING/
EXPORTER’S BANK
By: PAYMENT
43P: Partial Shipments
ALLOWED
43T: Transhipment 
NOT ALLOWED
44F: Port of Loading/Airport of Departure
ANY PORT IN EGYPT
44C: Port of Discharge/Airport of Destination
BANJUL, THE GAMBIA
45A: Description of Goods and/or Services
45,000 KGS COUNT NM 60/2 PW 60/40 BLEND 21.5 MICRON WOOL AND 2.5 DEN 
POLYESTER-YARN WORSTED COLOUR TBG
AS PER PROFORMA INVOICE NO.7196 DATED 01/02/2010
.
UP TO AGGREGATE AMOUN OF: US$ 312750.00 AS CFR VALUE (UPTO US$ 310500.00 
AS FOB VALUE AND UPTO US$ 2250.00 AS FREIGHT CHARGES)
46A: Documents Required
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A) FULL SET OF CLEAN ON BOARD OCEAN BILL OF LADING ISSUED OR ENDORSED 
TO THE ORDER OF BANK-C IN 3-ORIGINALS AND 3 NON-NEGOTIABLE COPIES 
INDICATING NAME AND ADDRESSES OF CHIPPING CO’S REPRESENTATIVE IN 
GABMIA MARKED FREIGHT PREPAID DATED NOT LATER THAN 09.06.2010 NOR 
PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THIS SWIFT, INDICATING SHIPMENT BY CLASSIFIED 
VESSEL FROM ANY PORT IN EGYPT TO BANJUL, THE GAMBIA
B) SIGNED COMMERCIAL INVOICES IN 3 ORIGINALS, 1 OF WHICH CERTIFIED BY 
EGYPT CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND LEGALIZED BY GAMBIAN 
CONSULATE, PLUS 1 EXTRA COPY ALL INCLUDING BNF’S STATEMENT THAT 
GOODS HAVE BEEN SHIPPED IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS 
STIPULATED IN RELATED PROFORMA INVOICES AND THE SUBSEQUENT 
AMENDMENT THERETO IF ANY.
C) SIGNED CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN CERTIFIED BY EGYT CHAMBER OF COMERCE 
AND INDUSTRY LEGALIZED BY GAMBIAN CONSULATE, IN 1 ORIGINAL CONFIRMING 
GOODS ORIGINATED IN EGYPT, PLUS 2 COPIES.
D) SIGNED DETALED PACKING LIST IN 3 COPIES
E) THE ORIGINAL INSPECTION CERTIFICATE ISSUED NOT PRIOR TO BILL OF 
LADING DATE BY APPOINTED COLLATERAL MANAGEMENT AND MONOTORING 
COMPANY(CMMC) OR ITS AGENT LETTERHEAD CERITFIYING THAT THE QUALITY, 
QUANTITY AND PACKING OF THE GOODS LOADED ARE STRICTLY COMPLYING 
WITH SPECIFICATION OF THE GOODS INDICATED IN THE RELATIVE PROFORMA 
INVOICE AND THE L/C AND ANY AMENDMENTS MADE THERETO AS PRESENTED 
TO THE CMMC BY THE APPLICANT/EXPORTER IN 1 ORIGINAL AND 1 COPY. SUCH 
PRESHIPMENT INSPECTION CERTIFICATE SHALL VERIFY THAT THE GOODS ARE 
IN CONFORMITY WITH GAMBIAN STANDARDS AS MENTIONED IN PROFORMA 
INVOICE AND CERTIFEID BY EGYPT CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 
(INSPECTION CHARGES SHALL BE PAID BY THE APPLICANT/EXPORTER). 
F) A DECLARATION SIGNED BY THE SHIPPING CO. OR ITS AUTHORIZED AGENT 
STATING THAT THE CARRYING VESSEL IS A CLASSIFIED ONE PLYING ON REGULAR 
LINER SERVICES IN 1 ORIGINAL AND 2 COPIES. 
G) SIGNED FREIGHT INVOICES ISSUED BY THE SHIPPING CO., THE CARRIER OR 
ITS AUTHORIZED AGENT IN 1 ORIGINAL WHICH TO BE CERTIFIED BY EGYPT 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY PLUS 1 COPY. 
47A: Additional Conditions
1) NEGOTIATION RESTRICTED TO THE ADVISING BANK
2) ALL DOCUMENTS SHOULD INDICATE:
A) APPLICANT’S NAME AND FULL ADDRESS AS THE NOTIFY PARTY
B) L/C NO. CEN/92040198 AND REG.NO. OF60801341
C) INSURANCE CO’S NAME OF: ISLAMIC TAKAFUL COMPANY (for illustration 
purpose), POLICY NO.4/0106/109971/9999/016000/1388
D) CUSTOMS TARIFF NO OF: 55095200
3) INSURANCE EFFECTED IN GAMBIA
4) THIRD PARTY SHIPPING DOCUMENTS NOT ACCEPTABLE
5) THE ISSUANCE DATE OF ALL DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE WITHIN THE VALIDTY 
DATE OF THIS CREDIT.
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6) THE REQUIRED DOCS. SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO BANK-C, CENTRAL BRANCH 
NO.1701, BANJUL, THE GAMBIA BY DHL IN TWO SEPARATE SETS.
7) NEGOTIATION DATE OF DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE INFORMED TO BANK-C BY 
SWIFT.
8) A HANDLING CHARGES OF US$50 WILL BE DEDUCTED FROM PROCEEDS FOR 
EACH DISCREPANT PRESENTATION (DISCREPANCY FEE).
9) ALL DOCUMENTS MUST BE ISSUED IN ENGLISH.
10) CHARTER PARTY BILL OF LADING NOT ACCEPTABLE.
11) PLEASE SEND ALL YOUR SWIFT MESSAGES TO BANK-C SWIT AS ‘BANKCGMBCEN’ 
(for illustration purpose)
71B: Charges
ALL BANKING CHARGES OUTSIDE THE GAMBIA ARE FOR ACCOUNT OF THE 
BENEFICIERY/EXPORTER
48: Period for Presentation:
21 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF BILL OF LADING WITHIN THE L/C VALIDITY
49: Confirmation Instructions
WITHOUT
53A: Reimbursing Bank
SWIFT CODE FOR THE PAYING AGENT OF BANK-B
ADDRESS FOR THE PAYING AGENT OF BANK-B
78: Instructions to the Paying/Accepting/Negotiating Bank
THIS L/C IS SUBJECT TO THE ICC UNIFORMED CUSTOMS PRACTICES 2007 REVISION 
(BROUCHURE 600) AND URR LATEST VERSION AND THIS L/C IS TO BE REFINANCED 
UNDER REFININCING 2-STEP MURABAHA AGREEMENT DATED 03/8/2017 WITH REF 
BANK-B/2017/TF3/GAM/0001 BETWEEN BANK-C AND BANK-B FOR A PERIOD OF 360 
DAYS. UPON RECEIVING THE DOCS. AND CERTIFYING TO US THAT THE TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS AF THE CREDIT HAVE BEEN COMPLIED WITH, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED 
HEREBY TO REIMBURSE YOURSELVES FOR YOUR PAYMENT UNDER THIS L/C ON 
BANK-B US DOLLAR ACCOUNT WITH BANK-B’S PAYING AGENT ON DUE DATE.
72: Sender to Receiver Information
THIS IS A CC MESSAGE FOR YOUR NOTIFICATION AND THE ORIGINAL ONE SENT TO 
ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK, ADDRESS OF ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK, SWIFT 
CODE OF ADVISING/EXPORTER’S BANK.
BEST REGARDS,
CENTRAL BRANCH
